

## Message Text

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT VALLETTA 0132 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO  
USUN NEW YORK, PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM,  
MAPUTO, LAGOS, GABORONE, MBABANE 31 JAN 78

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L VALLETTA 0132

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEF, RH, UK

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MORNING DISCUSSIONS WITH PF JANUARY 31

SUMMARY: 2ND MORING SESSION BEGAN WITH REVIEW OF PF  
DOCUMENT WITH MUGABE EMPHASIZING PF REQUIREMENT FOR  
DOMINANT ROLE DURING TRANSITION PERIOD. OWEN IN  
CAREFUL RESPONSE HIGHLIGHTED SOME MAJOR DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN PF PAPER AND APP, BUT DID NOT REJECT DOCUMENT  
OUTRIGHT. CARVER AND CHAND MADE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS,  
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SPELLING OUT PLANS FOR MILITARY DISPOSITION OF FORCES AND  
CREATION OF ZNA AS WELL AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFORT ON  
PART OF UNZF AND POLICE OBSERVERS. FOLLOWING PRIVATE  
DISCUSSIONS OVER LUNCH, DECISION WAS MADE TO RESUME

AFTERNOON SESSIONS WITH FOUR PRINCIPALS, ASSISTED BY  
TWO PERSONS FROM EACH DELEGATION. END SUMMARY

1. MORNING DISCUSSION BETWEEN UK/US AND PF DELEGATIONS  
BEGAN WITH WELL-ARGUED, SERIOUS, DELIBERATE EXPOSITION

BY MUGABE OF MAJOR POINTS OF PF DISCUSSION DOCUMENT CIRCULATED THE NIGHT BEFORE. MUGABE REVIEWED THE REASONING BEHIND THE DOCUMENT'S KEY POINTS, HIGHLIGHTING THE MAXIMUM DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PF PROPOSALS AND THOSE OF UK/US PLAN. THE PF STRESSED ONCE AGAIN ITS CONSISTENT REQUIREMENT THAT IT MUST PLAY THE PREDOMINANT ROLE IN TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE. ANY FINAL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE, HE SAID, CONCLUDED BETWEEN PF AND THE BRITISH ON BEHALF OF THE SETTLERS.

2. SOME NEW ELEMENTS EMERGED IN MUGABE'S EXPLICATION OF THE PF DOCUMENT, NOTABLY A SHIFT ON A UN PRESENCE AS WITNESS TO CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS, VOTER REGISTRATION AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE, CHIEFLY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF PF AVOWAL OF OPEN AND FREE ELECTIONS. REGARDING TRANSITION AND CEASE-FIRE MATTERS, MUGABE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PF SAW ITSELF IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT WIELDING ACTUAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO ITS CHIEF GOAL, INDEPENDENCE, WHETHER OR NOT ELECTIONS WERE HELD.

3. OWEN ASKED THE PF DELEGATION WHETHER IT WAS THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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INTENTION TO PUBLISH THE DOCUMENT OR TO GIVE IT TO THE PRESS. MUGABE AND KNOMO UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT IT WAS A PRIVATE PF DOCUMENT WHICH PROMPTED OWEN TO EXPRESS HIS STRONG RESERVATIONS CONCERNING HOW IT WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THE UK AND US AND CHIEFLY IN RHODESIA AS A FIRMLY HELD POSITION. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT VIS-A-VIS THE UK/US PLAN BUT AGREED TO REVIEW IT POINT BY POINT DURING THE MORNING'S DISCUSSION.

4. IN RESPONSE, KNOMO PRESENTED BASIC PF VIEW THAT AGREEMENT ON THE TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURE AND CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD COME FIRST, BECAUSE THEY ARE MILITARY CONCERNS. DISCUSSIONS ON A INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE LEFT TO A LATER TIME TO THOSE "WHO CALL THEMSELVES POLITICIANS." WHILE THE PF WANTED TO ALLAY FEARS THAT IT DESIRED A PERMANENT MILITARY JUNTA, SUCH MILITARY AGREEMENTS WERE PARAMOUNT IN THE SHORT TERM, IF A CEASE-FIRE AND UN ROLE WERE TO BE ACHIEVED.

5. CAREFULLY CHOOSING HIS WORDS, OWEN SEIZED THE INITIATIVE BY STATING HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDER OF TOPICS IN THE PF DOCUMENT AND BY HIS EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING OF WHY LAY BEHIND IT. HOWEVER, HE FIRMLY DISAVOWED ANY ARBITRARY DEMARCATION AMONG THE THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS (TRANSITION, CEASE-FIRE, INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION) AND EMPHASIZED HIS VIEW THAT THEY WERE LINKED TOGETHER.

6. OWEN REITERATED THE UK/US POSITION THAT THE TRANSITION PERIOD MUST SHOW THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF TRANSFER TO MAJORITY RULE. IN REVIEWING PF DOCUMENT, OWEN NOTED THAT IT RAISED POINTS ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN DISAGREEMENT IN PAST NEGOTIATIONS. HOW, HE ASKED, COULD THE PF JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP FROM THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS? COULD THIS EVER BE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE?  
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7. MUGABE COUNTERED THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS MUST FIRST REASSURE THE FIGHTERS BECAUSE THEY REPRESENTED THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE. TRUE NATIONALIST LEADERS WOULD SEE A PF-DOMINATED GOVERNING COUNCIL AS REPRESENTING THE REAL INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT IF THE PF WERE A UNITED NATIONALIST MOVEMENT SUCH AS FRELIMO, THE PF WOULD HAVE A GOOD CASE FOR A DOMINANT ROLE, BUT THE SITUATION WAS NOT THE SAME. ASSERTIVELY, NKOMO TOLD OWEN HIS VIEW WAS INCORRECT. A BRIEF EXCHANGE FOLLOWED, REVIEWING THE HISTORY OF AFRICAN-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS ON RHODESIA.

8. ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSION SHIFTED TO THE PF DOCUMENT AND THE ISSUE OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. ACCEPTANCE OF THE LIBERATION FORCES AS THE BASIS FOR A NEW ZNA WAS MUTUALLY ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT SHARP POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT AROSE ON THE QUESTION OF THE POLICE FORCE. A CLEAR PROBLEM NKOMO SAID WAS BRINGING IN MEN WHO HAVE NO IDEA OF WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT. HE INSISTED THAT A RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLICE, TO RESTRAIN THEM FROM FURTHER INJURING THE POPULATION BY MIXING THEM WITH PF POLICE, WAS NECESSARY.

9. YOUNG NOTED THAT UK/US HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE MORALITY OF THE PF POSITION BUT A WAY OUT HAD TO BE PROVIDED FOR MOST WHITES WHO OPPOSED THE PF. THE PF PLAN SEEMED TO LEAVE ONLY 2 OPTIONS FOR THEM: RUN OR FIGHT. POLICE SECURITY IS VITAL TO ENCOURAGE SMITH TO SETTLE.

10. AT OWEN'S REQUEST, LORD CARVER SPELLED OUT DETAILS OF THE MILITARY PLANNING, COVERING POLICE AND ARMED  
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FORCES. THE CLARITY AND COMPREHENSION OF HIS REMARKS CLEARLY INTRIGUED THE PF DELEGATES, MOST OF WHOM HAD NO IDEA OF THE BREADTH OF THE UK/US PLANNING IN THIS AREA. MUGABE TOOK COPIOUS NOTES AND NKOMO ALSO LISTENED INTENSELY. THE PF MILITARY MEN, TONGAGARA AND KANGAI

HAD SEVERAL WHISPERED CONSULTATIONS.

11. IN CLEAR TERMS, CARVER SET FORTH HIS GOAL AS CREATION OF ONE ZNA FROM TWO OPPOSING ARMIES WITHIN SIX MONTHS. SMITH KNOWS THIS TOO. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDE: COSTS FOR A PROJECTED TOTAL FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 24,000 MEN; DISESTABLISHMENT OF ALL WHITE UNITS; ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR NEW BATTALIONS FROM GUERRILLA UNITS; INTEGRATION OF 3 RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLE BATTALIONS INTO ZNA; AND FORMATION OF NATIONAL GUARD (ON CALL). POLICE NOT ZNA WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER DURING TRANSITION PERIOD, OBSERVED BY A UN CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE.

12. OWEN, IN FAIRLY HURRIED FASHION, EMPHASIZED THE UTILITY OF EXCHANGING DETAILS RELATING TO UK/US PROPOSALS AND THE KEY ROLE OF THE UN'S PARTICIPATION AT EVERY LEVEL TO ASSURE IRREVERSIBILITY. REFERRING BACK TO PF DOCUMENT, OWEN STRONGLY STATED THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING RESIDENT COMMISSIONER'S EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (DEVOLVING FROM BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY ENABLING LEGISLATION) AND HIS POWER TO ENSURE LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION. OWEN ALSO ARGUED THAT BRITISH ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE UN PROVIDED IMPORTANT MEANS OF REASSURING ALL CONCERNED ON IRREVERSIBILITY AND FAIRNESS OF PROCESS. AN OFFER WAS MADE TO HAVE CARVER AND PREM CHAND GO INTO GREATER DETAIL.

13. NKOMO INSISTED EXPLANATIONS WERE WELCOME BUT THAT UK/US SHOULD ADDRESS PF PROPOSALS AS WELL. OWEN GAVE NO RESPONSE, TURNING TO CHAND FOR HIS REMARKS.  
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14. CHAND BEGAN BY STATING HIS CONVICTION AS RESULT OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES THAT THERE WAS A DEFINITE ROLE FOR THE UN TO PLAY, IF PARTIES REQUESTED, TO PROVIDE ELEMENT OF IMPARTIALITY AND OBJECTIVITY NEEDED IN RHODESIAN SITUATION. HE SAID THAT UN COULD HELP NOT ONLY WITH SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS BUT ALSO WITH CEASE-FIRE, CREATION OF ZNA, AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER THROUGH POLICE OBSERVERS. CHAND DESCRIBED HIS INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT A NO-SHOOT, NO-MOVEMENT RULE AS BASIS OF CEASE-FIRE, AS WELL AS INTENTION TO CONSULT WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO CONTROL MOVEMENT OF FORCES OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. HE GAVE DETAILED EXPOSITION ON EFFECT OF STATIONING OF POLICE OBSERVERS AT VILLAGE LEVEL AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE.

15. FOLLOWING UP ON CHAND'S OVERVIEW, NKOMO NOTED HIS UNCERTAINTY ON CONTROLLING VARIOUS GROUPS AS SEEN IN CARVER-CHAND SCENARIO. EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE UN COULD NEITHER PREEMPT THE PF'S RIGHT TO BRING PEACE

NOR NEUTRALIZE THE ABILITY OF ZIMBABWEANS TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT HOW TO GAIN FREEDOM.

16. OWEN AGAIN REVIEWED UK/US PROPOSALS FOR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND REITERATED VIEW THAT A MINIMUM PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS WAS ESSENTIAL TO CARRY OUT DECISIONS NEGOTIATED PREVIOUSLY IN ORDER TO ALLAY SUSPICIONS OF PF SUPPORTERS. ALLOWING THAT UK HAD NO GREAT LUST TO GO BACK INTO RHODESIA TO TAKE OVER ADMINISTRATION DURING TRANSITION, MAXIMUM EFFORT WAS NECESSARY TO BRING INDEPENDENCE IN OPTIMUM CONDITIONS. RESIDENT COMMISSIONER MUST HAVE CONTROL OF LAW AND ORDER; FINANCIAL CRISIS MUST BE RESOLVED POSSIBLY THROUGH CREATION OF ZDF; AND ZIMBABWE CONFIDENTIAL

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PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT MUST BECOME INVOLVED IN RUNNING THINGS.

17. BEFORE CLOSING THE SESSION AT 12:45 PM, OWEN AGAIN EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES. HOWEVER, MUGABE REASSERTED PF INTEREST IN SERIOUS REVIEW OF ITS DOCUMENT AND RECOGNITION THAT PF SHOULD HAVE DOMINANT ROLE, NOT MERELY SUBORDINATE ONE ON A TRANSITION BODY. OWEN REPLIED THAT THE PF DOCUMENT COULD BE VIEWED AS A DISCUSSION PAPER WITHOUT STATUS. YOUNG POINTED TO THE PROBLEM OF EXPLOITATION INTERNALLY IN RHODESIA SHOULD THE PF DOCUMENT GET INTO HANDS OF THE PRESS. MUGABE ASKED IF UK WAS WILLING TO SHARE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH HE HAD BEEN SPEAKING WITH THE PF (ANNEX A ON TRANSITION PERIOD), BUT OWEN AFTER HESITATION REPLIED THAT REVISED PAPER MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING FOLLOWING FURTHER STUDY OF THE PF'S CONCERNS.

18. COMMENT: MEETING WAS AGAIN CONDUCTED IN BUSINESS LIKE BUT CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE WITH EFFORT MADE ON ALL SIDES TO KEEP TALKS ON SERIOUS LEVEL. WE GIVE OWEN SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT FOR MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO AVOID NEEDLESSLY ANTAGONIZING PF BUT NOT EQUIVOCATING ON CLEAR LIMITS TO WHAT BRITISH COULD ACCEPT IN THE PF PAPER. HIS OVERALL GOOD PERFORMANCE IN KEEPING TALKS GOING IN A GENERALLY FAVORABLE DIRECTION WAS MARRED ONLY BY HIS INDECISION ON HANDING OVER NEW UK-US TRANSITION PAPER, WHICH PF COULD HAVE TAKEN AS LACK OF CONFIDENCE, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE HAD JUST URGED THEM TO KEEP THEIR OWN PAPER OUT OF PUBLIC VIEW. NEVERTHELESS, TALKS ENDED ON A POSITIVE NOTE WITH AGREEMENT REACHED DURING LUNCH TO HOLD SMALL EXECUTIVE SESSION (HEADS OF DELEGATION ACCOMPANIED BY TWO) DURING AFTERNOON. LAINGEN UNQUOTE VANCE  
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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

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